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Dimension Films Legacy
Mark R. Carter, J.D., Ph.D.*
ABSTRACT
Copyright law simultaneously protects recorded music in
two distinct ways: as a musical work (i.e. composition) and as a
sound recording. Copyright law protects all copyrightable works
against unapproved reproduction (i.e., copying). Normally, the
substantial similarity standard tests reproduction infringement.
A sound-recording sample may be so short as to lack substantial
similarity to the musical-work and thus not infringe it. But
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films chucked substantial
similarity to hold that the same sample, however short,
necessarily infringes the sound-recording reproduction right.
This disparate copyright protection between musical works and
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sound recordings of the same sample has led to the “mashup
problem.”
Substantial similarity can be broken into two basic types:
comprehensive nonliteral similarity and fragmented literal
similarity. This paper proposes a framework for applying the
fragmented literal similarity test to both musical-work and
sound-recording reproduction infringement. First, it describes
the framework for musical works based on the innate
discretization of musical works as notes. Second, it describes
breaking sound recordings into sound snippets and weighs the
copied snippets’ quantitative and qualitative values to the
copyrighted recording. Third, it outlines applying the
framework to Swirsky v. Carey, Bridgeport, and Girl Talk’s
sampling recordings.
I. Disparate Infringement Standards for Copying Musical
Works and Sound Recordings ........................................ 672
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A. One Road to Protecting Recorded Music in Two
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I. DISPARATE INFRINGEMENT STANDARDS FOR
COPYING MUSICAL WORKS AND SOUND RECORDINGS
Copyright law simultaneously protects recorded music in
two distinct ways: as a musical work (i.e., composition), and as
a sound recording.1 Copyright law protects all copyrightable
works against unapproved reproduction (i.e., copying).2 A
sound-recording sample may be so short as to be de minimis
and thus not infringe the musical-work reproduction right.3 But
the same sample, however short, necessarily infringes the
sound-recording reproduction right.4 Thus, a recording
containing one sample from one sound recording might not
infringe the musical work but would necessarily infringe the
sound recording though the musical work and the sound
recording would represent the same music.
This disparate copyright protection has led to the “mashup
problem.”5 The simplest mashup is “a song created out of pieces
of two or more songs, usually by overlaying the vocal track of
one song seamlessly over the music track of another.”6 Gregg
Gillis, who records as “Girl Talk,” is a notorious mashup
sampler.7 Gillis samples hundreds of songs to make an album.8
Does it make sense to hold a mashup artist, like Gillis, liable
for sound-recording infringement from copying a tiny,
unrecognizable, sound-recording snippet which fails to infringe
the underlying musical work?

1. 17 U.S.C. § 102(2), (7) (2006).
2. Id. § 106(1).
3. Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing
JAMES NEWTON, Choir, on AXUM (ECM 1981) sampled by BEASTIE BOYS, Pass
the Mic, on CHECK YOUR HEAD (Grand Royal 1992)).
4. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I), 410 F.3d
792, 798 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing FUNKADELICS, Get Off Your Ass and Jam,
on LET’S TAKE IT TO THE STAGE (Westbound 1975) sampled by N.W.A., 100
Miles and Runnin’, on I GOT THE HOOK UP (Dimension 1992) (film
soundtrack)).
5. See, e.g., David Mongillo, The Girl Talk Dilemma: Can Copyright Law
Accommodate New Forms of Sample-Based Music?, 9 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y, Spring 2009, at 3.
6. MICHAEL GEOGHEGAN & DAN KLASS, PODCAST SOLUTIONS: THE
COMPLETE GUIDE TO AUDIO AND VIDEO PODCASTING 45 (2005).
7. Mongillo, supra note 5, at 2.
8. Girl Talk’s Feed the Animals: The Official Sample List, WAXY.ORG,
http://waxy.org/2008/10/feed_the_animals_official_sample_list/ (last visited
Feb. 6, 2013).
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This paper proposes a framework for applying the
fragmented literal similarity test to both musical-work and
sound-recording reproduction infringement.
Part II gives context for the proposal. First, it reviews the
history leading to musical-work and sound-recording copyright
protection for recorded music. Second, it describes the
substantial-similarity test, including the fragmented literal
similarity
test,
for
copyrighted-works
reproduction
infringement. Finally, it describes the key court opinions on
musical-work and sound-recording reproduction infringement
by sampling.
Part III presents the proposed fragmented literal similarity
test framework. First, it describes the framework for musical
works based on the innate discretization of musical works as
notes. Second, it describes breaking sound recordings into
sound snippets and weighs the snippet’s quantitative and
qualitative values to the copyrighted recording. Finally, it
outlines applying the framework to three situations: 1) Swirsky
v. Carey’s musical-work infringement; 2) Bridgeport Music, Inc.
v. Dimension Films’ sound-recording infringement; and 3)
potential
musical-composition
and
sound-recording
infringement by Girl Talk’s Feed the Animals.
II. INFRINGING RECORDED MUSIC
A. ONE ROAD TO PROTECTING RECORDED MUSIC IN TWO WAYS—
THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR MUSICAL WORKS
AND SOUND RECORDINGS
The Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause grants
Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”9 Starting in 1790, Congress passed the first of
many Copyright Acts.10 The 1831 Copyright Act was the first to
protect music. It granted a musical-composition’s author the
“sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and
vending” it.11 To copyright the musical composition, the author
had to “deposit a printed copy of the title of such . . . musical

9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10. See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL
INFORMATION ECONOMY 22 (2d ed. 2006).
11. 1831 Copyright Act, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (1831).
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composition in the . . . district court” where the author
resided.12 For each musical composition copy, the Act also
required the author to “impress on the face thereof” a deposit
notice in the district court.13 Thus, the 1831 Act impliedly
assumed a tangible form for the musical composition.
Music recording and playback technology progressed
through the 19th century’s second half. First, Edison invented
the phonograph in 1877.14 The phonograph recorded sounds in
grooves on a cylinder which could be played back to make
sounds approximating the recorded sounds.15 A commercial
Victrola appeared in 1906.16 Second, several inventors
developed mechanical music machines based on organs and
pianos.17
To keep pace with these technological advances, the 1909
Copyright Act expanded music protection to include musicalcomposition “mechanical” reproduction rights for player piano
rolls and phonograph records.18 In 1908 the Supreme Court had
held a musical-composition copy to be “a written or printed
record of it [the composition] in intelligible notation.”19 The
Court expressly held piano rolls, music box cylinders, and
gramophone records were musical composition copies.20 But
because Congress knew of the rolls, cylinders, and records
when it amended the copyright laws in 1897 and 1901, but
levied damages based on sheets copied, the Court reasoned
Congress had not wanted copyright to extend to rolls, cylinders,
and records.21 The Court specifically suggested Congress could
amend the law to include these new media.22 Congress
responded by including a mechanical-reproduction right in the
new musical-composition copyright.23 “[The] sale of
12. Id. § 4.
13. Id. § 5.
14. Improvement in Phonograph or Speaking Machs., U.S. Patent No.
200,521 (filed Dec. 24, 1877).
15. Id.
16. COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 444.
17. See, e.g., Organette Patents, ORGANETTE MUSIC REPOSITORY,
http://music.organettes.com/patents/home (last updated Jan. 24, 2011).
18. COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 26–27.
19. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908).
20. Id. at 17–18.
21. Id. at 16–18.
22. Id. at 18.
23. COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 47–48.
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interchangeable parts, such as disks, rolls, bands, or cylinders
for use in mechanical music-producing machines adapted to
reproduce the copyrighted music” infringed the new musicalcomposition copyright.24
Over sixty years later, to prevent bootleggers from copying
and distributing previously recorded music,25 Congress
conferred a copyright in sound recordings made on or after
February 15, 1972.26 (State copyright laws protected sound
recordings made before February 15, 1972.27 Federal copyright
does not preempt state copyright protection for sound
recordings made before February 15, 1972.28) The 1971 Sound
Recording Act added sound recordings to the copyrightablework types.29 The Act defined sound recordings as “works that
result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken or other
sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion
picture.”30 The copyright owner had the exclusive reproduction
right to “duplicate the sound recording in a tangible form that
directly or indirectly recaptures the actual sounds fixed in the
The
Act
defined
sound
recording
recording . . . .”31
reproductions as “material objects . . . from which the sounds
could
be
perceived,
reproduced,
or
otherwise
communicated . . . .”32 The sound recording definition expressly
included “parts of machines of instruments serving to
reproduce mechanically the musical work” including
“interchangeable parts, such as discs or tapes for use in
mechanical music-producing machines . . . .”33
The 1971 Sound Recording Act also expressly retained a
distinct musical-work copyright for recorded music.34 The Act
provided separate notice requirements for musical works and

24. 1909 Copyright Act, ch. 320, § 25(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1081–82 (1909)
(current version at 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2006)).
25. DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC
BUSINESS 399–400 (8th ed. 2012); see also M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY ET AL.,
THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY
59–60, 70 (9th ed. 2003).
26. COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 444.
27. Id.
28. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552 (1972).
29. 1971 Sound Recording Act, Pub. L. 92-140, § 1(a), 85 Stat. 391, 391.
30. Id. § 1(e).
31. Id. § 1(a).
32. Id. § 1(e).
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Id.
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sound recordings.35 As noted, the Act specified sound-recording
reproductions included “parts of instruments serving to
reproduce mechanically the musical work . . . .”36 Further, the
Act defined “interchange-able parts, such as discs or tapes, for
use in mechanical music producing machines adapted to
reproduce copyrighted musical works” as “copies of the
copyrighted musical works . . . .”37
The resulting federal copyright structure creates separate
musical work and sound recording reproduction rights for the
typical music-album song. The 1976 Copyright Act copyrights
work on fixing expression in a tangible medium regardless of
formal notice and publication.38 So, for instance, a songwriter
can write a song as sheet music having notes for instruments
and voices, possibly with lyrics, to form a copyrighted musical
work.39 A band’s recording of the song would be a copyrighted
sound recording.40 The musical work and sound recording
owners may not be the same entity; the songwriter may own
the musical work, while the band, the producer, or a record
company may own the sound recording. In fact, for a record
company to make compact discs (CDs) containing recorded-song
copies, it would need reproduction rights from both the musical
work and the sound recording owners.41
B. RECORDED-MUSIC REPRODUCTION INFRINGEMENT
1. Reproduction Infringement as Substantial Similarity42
The Copyright Act’s § 106(1) grants the copyright owner
the exclusive right “to reproduce the copyrighted work . . . .”43
An independently created work would not infringe the
copyrighted work, so as a threshold, an alleged infringer must
35. Id. § 1(d).
36. Id. § 1(e) (emphasis added).
37. Id. § 2.
38. COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 48.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2006).
40. See id. § 102(a)(7).
41. COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 445 (comparing musical-work and
sound-recording copyrights).
42. See generally id. at 325–64 (describing reproduction infringement
with excerpts from major cases); PETER C. WEILER, ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA
AND THE LAW 344–65 (3d ed. 2006) (applying substantial similarity to book,
play, and movie infringement).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006).
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have access to the copyrighted work.44 Assuming access, an
exact copy of the copyrighted work would infringe the
reproduction right.45 But, a suspect work need only bear a
“substantial similarity” to the copyrighted work to infringe.46
The substantial similarity standard and the de minimis use
defense apply to reproduction rights of multiple types of
copyrighted works.47 In applying the standard, courts often
filter out a copyrighted work’s unprotectable elements48 before
comparing an allegedly infringing work against the copyrighted
work.49
Nimmer formulated substantial similarity as derived from
two basic types: 1) comprehensive nonliteral similarity, and 2)
fragmented literal similarity.50
a. Comprehensive Nonliteral Similarity—Copying a Work’s
Fundamental Essence or Structure
Comprehensive nonliteral similarity shows “a similarity
not just as to a particular line or paragraph or other minor
segment, but where the fundamental essence or structure of
one work is duplicated in another.”51 But the similarity cannot
be an abstract idea.52
Courts have employed many tests to evaluate substantial
similarity between the suspect works and the copyrighted
work. Three tests are: 1) the ordinary-lay-observer test; 2) the
average-lay-observer test; and 3) the total concept and feel.

44. Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Arnstein v.
Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J.)).
45. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 359.
46. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Michael Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir.
2000); Selle, 741 F.2d at 900.
47. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, COPYRIGHT 369–70 (2d ed. 2009)
(citing Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801–03 (4th
Cir. 2001) (applying the substantial similarity standard to costumes) and
Gordon v. Nextel Commc’ns, 345 F.3d 922, 924–25 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying
the de minimis defense to a commercial’s background illustration)).
48. Copyright does not extend to “any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principal, or discovery.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(2006).
49. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.
1930) (L. Hand, J.) (noting copyright does not protect ideas as determined by a
series of abstractions of the copyrighted work).
50. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.03 (2010).
51. Id. § 13.03[A][1].
52. Id.
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Generally, the Second Circuit recognizes substantial
similarity when an “ordinary observer, unless he set out to
detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and
regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.”53
Some courts test whether an “average lay observer” would
recognize the alleged copy as taken from the copyrighted
work.54 Where a copyright owner’s work includes public domain
elements, infringement requires substantial similarity to those
elements providing copyrightability.55 Where the copyrighted
work does not include public domain elements, the Second
Circuit employs the less demanding “average lay observer”
test.56
But particularly when comparing pictorial works, courts
may guide the “average lay observer” test with a “total concept
and feel” test weighing the work’s whole arrangement.57
b. Fragmented Literal Similarity—Scattered Literal Copying
Fragmented literal similarity is based on literal elements
scattered throughout an infringing work.58 Though the criteria
for deciding fragmented literal similarity vary, they generally
weigh the elements’ qualitative and quantitative value to the
copyrighted work.59

53. Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960) (Hand, J.))) (emphasis added).
54. Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 711
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd, 360 F.2d 1021, 1022
(2d Cir. 1966) and declining to apply Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner
Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960)) (movie poster).
55. Boisson, 273 F.3d at 272 (quoting Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown
Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991)).
56. Id. (citing Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 101–02 (2d Cir. 1999)).
57. Id. at 272–73 (discussing prior case law in the Second and Ninth
Circuits). But see Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir.
2002) (quoting Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045
(9th Cir. 1994)) (applying the total-concept and feel test as part of subjectively
comparing children’s stories’ expressive elements).
58. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A][2]. This paper’s sound
quanta may differ from Nimmers’ quanta.
59. Id.
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c. De Minimis Copying and Fair Use Affirmative Defense
Though a work may contain a copyrighted work’s parts, the
parts may be so small as to lack import (i.e., be de minimis).60
In essence, the de minimis use defense asserts lack of
substantial similarity.61
In contrast, fair use limits infringement right and
affirmatively defends against infringement.62 Even so, courts
sometimes conflate “de minimis” and “fair use.”63
2. Recorded Music Reproduction Infringement
As with the general reproduction infringement analysis
above, absent direct copying evidence, recorded music
reproduction infringement requires the defendant’s access to
the plaintiff’s work and substantial similarity between the
defendant’s and plaintiff’s works.64 Traditionally, assuming
access, courts employed an “average lay observer” test to test
the musical-work’s substantial similarity.65 Recently, courts
have tested musical works with an objective extrinsic test
coupled with a subjective intrinsic test.66

60. Id. (citing Warner Bros. Inc. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983)
(Motley, J.)); see also id. § 8.01[G].
61. Id. § 8.01[G] & nn.62–62.1 (citing Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ASP.
Consulting L.L.C., 560 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009); Peter Letterese & Assocs.,
Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287, 1306–07 (11th
Cir. 2008); Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004); and
Gordon v. Nextel Commc’ns, 345 F.3d 922, 924 (6th Cir. 2003)).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 44, 58, 59–61
(C.C.D. 1869) (No. 8,136) (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344, 348
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (Story, J.) (stating fair use concepts) and Cary
v. Kearsley, [1803] 4 Esp. 168; 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680 (K.B.) (British “fair
abridgement” doctrine)) (coining the term “fair use”); see generally COHEN ET
AL., supra note 10, at 24, 526–27 (briefly outlining fair-use history).
63. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A][2][a]. As conflation
examples, Nimmer & Nimmer cite, inter alia, Matthews Conveyor Co. v.
Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943) and Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.). NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A][2][a] n.95.
64. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Michael Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir.
2000) (citing Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996)); Selle v.
Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1984).
65. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
66. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004) rev’g 226 F. Supp.
2d 1224 (2002) (discussing XSCAPE, One of Those Love Songs, on TRACES OF
MY LIPSTICK (So So Def 1998) allegedly copied by MARIAH CAREY, Thank God
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As stated above, starting in 1972, federal copyright has
protected both musical works and sound recordings.67 Under
recent precedents, a music sample will infringe a soundrecording’s reproduction right68 but the sample might not
infringe the musical work.69
a. Copying Musical Works—The Ninth Circuit’s Newton v.
Diamond Decision
The Ninth Circuit’s Newton v. Diamond decision is the
main precedent for musical-work reproduction infringement.70
Newton sued the Beastie Boys for infringing his musical work,
Choir.71 Newton performed and recorded Choir and licensed the
sound recording to ECM Records in 1981, but he kept all the
musical-work rights.72
In 1992, the Beastie Boys repeated (looped) six-seconds of
Choir’s sound recording for their recording, Pass the Mic.73
They had licensed the sound recording from ECM Records but
not the musical work from Newton.74
The Beastie Boy’s loop was held to be a non-infringing de
minimis use of the musical work.75 Because Newton did not
assert sound-recording rights, the court did not rule on soundrecording infringement.76 The sound recording corresponds to
part of the musical work, three notes (C, D-flat, and C), sung
over a fluted background C.77 The score instructed the whole
song to be played largo/senza-misura.78 Also, as the court

I Found You, on RAINBOW (Columbia 2000)).
67. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (2006).
68. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F. Supp. 182,
185 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). This decision did not specify whether sampling infringed
the musical work or the sound recording.
69. Compare Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I),
410 F.3d 792, 800–04 (6th Cir. 2005) (sound recordings), with Newton v.
Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2004) (musical works).
70. Newton, 388 F.3d at 1192–96 (outlining de minimis use and
reproduction rights).
71. Id. at 1190.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1192.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (noting largo/senza-misura means “slowly/without-measure”).
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reviewed the district court’s summary judgment decision for
the Beastie Boys, it assumed all Newton’s allegations.79 In
particular, the court assumed the score’s instructions for
overblowing the flute note while singing the vocal notes.80
In order to decide if the sound recording contained unique
musical-work parts, the court filtered out the parts unique to
the recording.81 Copyright law only allows Newton to protect
the musical work he fixed in the written score’s tangible
medium.82 After filtering out the performance parts, the court
reasoned the musical-work substantial similarity test reduced
to Nimmer’s fragmented literal similarity test due to the
limited copying.83 Applying the fragmented literal similarity
test, the three-note section only appeared once in Choir, so it
was quantitatively insignificant to Choir.84 Because the section
was no more significant to Choir overall than any other section,
it was also qualitatively insignificant to Choir.85 Thus, the
sample’s quantitative and qualitative insignificance to the
original work implied a de minimis use in the suspect work.86
The court held the Beastie Boys’ sampling of Choir in Pass the
Mic failed the fragmented limited similarity test and was thus
a de minimis use.87
b. Copying Sound Recordings
Sampling sound-recording reproduction infringement is
much less clear. The Sixth Circuit’s controversial Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I)88 is the main
opinion.89 But the Eleventh Circuit District Court90 and a New
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1193–94.
82. Id. at 1191–92.
83. Id. at 1195 (citing 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2] (2010)).
84. Id. at 1195–96.
85. Id. at 1196.
86. Id. at 1192–93.
87. Id. at 1195–96.
88. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I), 410 F.3d
792 passim (6th Cir. 2005) (film soundtrack).
89. See, e.g., COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 449–58 (including Bridgeport
I regarding sampling of sound recordings); Joshua Crum, Comment, The Day
the (Digital) Music Died: Bridgeport, Sampling Infringement, and Proposed
Middle Ground, 2008 BYU L. REV. 943, 957–60; Mongillo, supra note 5, at 17–
22; Tracy L. Reilly, Debunking the Top Three Myths of Digital Sampling: An
Endorsement of the Bridgeport Music Court’s Attempt to Afford “Sound”
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York State court,91 applying New York’s own copyright laws,
expressly rejected Bridgeport I’s analysis.
i. The Sixth Circuit—Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension
Films (Bridgeport I)
Bridgeport I involved sampling Get Off Your Ass and Jam
(Get Off), by George Clinton and the Funkadelics, for 100 Miles
and Runnin’ (100 Miles). The sampled part lasted four seconds
and contained three single notes from a guitar solo. The notes
would have formed a chord if played at the same time.92
(Unlike piano chords, guitar chords rarely have all notes played
simultaneously because strumming a guitar necessarily
involves playing individual strings at different times; the faster
a player strums, the less time there is between plucking each
string.93) The sampler lowered the notes’ pitch, looped them for
sixteen beats, and played them in five places in 100 Miles.
Dimension Films included 100 Miles in I Got the Hook Up’s
soundtrack. Musical work infringement was not at issue
because Dimension Films had a synchronizing license.94
The court found 100 Miles failed to infringe the Get Off
sound recording regardless of whether it applied the de
minimis standard or the fragmented limited similarity test.95
The court reasoned that de minimis analysis comes from
substantial similarity analysis because de minimis analysis
“argues that the literal copying of a small and insignificant
portion of the copyrighted work should be allowed.”96 Further,
the district court viewed fragmented literal similarity as a

Copyright Protection to Sound Recordings, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355, 357–58
(2008).
90. Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1338–41 (S.D.
Fla. 2009).
91. Decision and Order at 3–5, EMI Records Ltd. v. Premise Media Corp.
L.P., No. 601209 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 13, 2008).
92. Id.
93. See NEVILLE H. FLETCHER & THOMAS D. ROSSING, THE PHYSICS OF
MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS 255, 352–59 (2d ed. 1998).
94. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I), 410 F.3d
792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230
F. Supp. 2d 830, 833–38 (M.D. Tenn. 2002)).
95. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 841
(M.D. Tenn. 2002).
96. Id. (citing Warner Bros. Inc. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983)
(Motley, J.)).
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substantial-similarity test.97 Thus, the district court applied
the substantial similarity test to musical-work and soundrecording sampling.
But the appeals court held 100 Miles infringed the Get Off
sound recording. It rejected the district court’s analysis for its
own statutory interpretation98 and put forth the bright-line
rule that any sampling infringes the sampled sound
recording.99
The appeals court unconvincingly stressed judicial
economy failed to dictate its rule. It said, “When one considers
that [the district judge] has hundreds of other cases all
involving different samples from different songs, the value of a
principled bright-line rule becomes apparent. We want to
emphasize, however, that considerations of judicial economy
are not what drives this opinion.”100 The court failed to
elaborate on the hundreds of other cases. But the follow-up
case, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc.
(Bridgeport II), referred to several hundred copyright
infringement cases filed by Bridgeport Music, Inc. and
Southfield Music, Inc. against roughly 800 defendants.101 The
district court split the original complaints into 476 cases.102
With such a huge backlog, judicial economy seems to have
driven Bridgeport I’s bright-line rule.
Even so, according to Bridgeport II, though Bridgeport I
declined to apply the fragmented literal similarity test to sound
recordings,103 the Sixth Circuit deemed fragmented literal
similarity as a valid musical-work infringement test.104
Bridgeport I acknowledged potential logical problems with
analyzing sound-recording and musical-work infringement
differently.105 But it justified the difference due to problems
applying a de minimis or substantial similarity standard to
sound recordings, its statutory interpretation of § 114(b), and

97. Id.
98. Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 797–805.
99. Id. at 799–804.
100. Id. at 802.
101. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc. (Bridgeport II), 585
F.3d 267, 272 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N The
Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 2003)).
102. Id.
103. Bridgeport II, 585 F.3d at 275.
104. Id. at 275–77.
105. See Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 801.
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small sound-recording parts’ innate values.106 At key points,
Bridgeport I relied on papers by Jeffrey R. Houle, Rebecca
Morris through Stephen R. Wilson, Susan J. Latham, and
Christopher D. Abramson.107 But Bridgeport I misleadingly
quoted these papers against context.
a. Houle Argued Literal Infringement Should Be Weighed
in Light of the Copied Sections’ Qualitative Import thus
Supporting Fragmented Literal Similarity for Sampling
To reject applying de minimis analysis and substantial
similarity to sound recordings, Bridgeport I quoted Jeffrey R.
Houle:
Thus, it seems like the only way to infringe on a sound recording is to
re-record sounds from the original work, which is exactly the nature
of digital sound sampling. Then the only issue becomes whether the
defendant re-recorded sound from the original. This suggests that the
substantial similarity test is inapplicable to sound recordings.108

But contrary to this isolated quote, Houle proposed
tempering infringement with the copied section’s qualitative
import. Houle’s paper mainly concerned “whether the practice
of digitally sampling a copyrighted record violates the Sound
Recording Act of 1971.”109 The quote sits in the “Judicial
Tendency and Sound Recording Act” section where Houle
argues “[j]udicial tendency . . . fails to take into account the
nature and substance of the notes taken.”110 Houle’s preceding
paragraph argued copying some qualitatively important
musical-composition or sound-recording parts could infringe
without copying the whole song.111 The paper concluded:
In reality, the activity of digital sampling only becomes an issue
when the portion sampled is qualitatively rich and allows the sampler
to imbue his song with the qualities and identity of the copyright
protected work. This is tantamount to pirating the entire song from its

106. Id. at 801–02.
107. Id. at 801 n.10, 802 nn.13–15.
108. Id. at 801 n.13 (quoting Jeffrey R. Houle, Digital Audio Sampling,
Copyright Law and the American Music Industry: Piracy or Just a Bad
“RAP”?, 37 LOY. L. REV. 879, 896 (1992)).
109. Jeffery R. Houle, Digital Audio Sampling Copyright Law and the
American Music Industry: Piracy of Just a “RAP”?, 37 LOY. L. REV. 879, 882
(1992).
110. Id. at 895 (emphasis added).
111. Id.
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author since the samples taken most often contain the “soul” and
substance of the host song.112

Houle supported weighing a copied section’s qualitative import
in deciding sound-recording reproduction infringement by
sampling. Thus, in essence, Houle supported a fragmented
literal similarity test for sound-recording infringement.113
b. Morris Suggested the Lack of a Bright-Line Rule
Already Motivated Samplers to Settle Before Trial Without
Bridgeport I
Bridgeport I also justified the bright-line rule over de
minimis analysis and/or substantial similarity by quoting
Stephen R. Wilson, quoting Rebecca Morris:
The current lack of bright-line rules leads to unpredictability, which
may be one reason that so few sampling cases are brought to
trial . . . . A cost-benefit analysis generally indicates that is less
expensive for a sampler to purchase a license before sampling (or
settle a post-sampling lawsuit) rather than take his chances in an
expensive trial, the outcome of which . . . is nearly impossible to
predict with any degree of certainty.114

Wilson quoted Morris to support the assertion that most
sampling cases settled.115 Neither Morris nor Wilson explained
why cost-benefit analysis works against bringing sampling
suits to trial.
Morris seems to have impliedly assumed basic decisiontheory tenets. When an actor must choose between outcomes
without any information, the outcome probabilities should be
assumed equal.116 Each outcome’s expected value is its value

112. Id. at 902 (emphasis added).
113. Cf. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A][2][a] (“[E]ven if the
similar material is quantitatively small, if it is qualitatively important, the
trier of fact may properly find substantial similarity.”).
114. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I), 410 F.3d
792, 802 n.15 (6th Cir. 2005) (alterations in original) (quoting Stephen R.
Wilson, Music Sampling Lawsuits: Does Looping Music Samples Defeat the De
Minimis Defense, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 179, 187 n.97 (2002) (quoting Rebecca
Morris, When is a CD Factory Not Like a Dance Hall?: The Difficulty of
Establishing Third-Party Liability for Infringing Digital Music Samples, 18
CARDOZA ARTS & ENT. L.J. 257, 274 (2000))).
115. Stephen R. Wilson, Music Sampling Lawsuits: Does Looping Music
Samples Defeat the De Mininis Defense, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 179, 187 (2002).
116. E.g., DAVID R. HENDERSON & CHARLES L. HOOPER, MAKING GREAT
DECISIONS IN BUSINESS AND IN LIFE 160–61 (2006).
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multiplied by its probability.117 The best choice has the highest
expected value.118
Applying these concepts in the pre-Bridgeport I regime, the
sampling trial-defendant faced two outcomes: 1) winning
without getting any payment; or 2) losing and paying
infringement damages. Assuming lawyer fees would be the
same for winning and losing, the unpredictability of winning or
losing (i.e., each having a probability of one-half) and outcome
(1)’s zero return and outcome (2)’s potentially large costs made
going to trial a bad choice compared with settling. Thus, the
astute sampler would have avoided going to trial and settled.
This analysis shows the Morris quote gives little support
for Bridgeport I’s bright-line rule. Though Bridgeport I’s brightline rule further pushes samplers to settle, the unpredictability
caused by the lack of a bright-line rule already strongly pushed
samplers to settle.
c. Unlike Brideport I, Latham Recognized a Possible De
Minimus Use (I.E. Lack of Substantial Similarity), but
May Have Conflated De Minimus Use and Fair Use
Bridgeport I interpreted § 114(b) to imply “a sound
recording owner has the exclusive right to ‘sample’ his own
recordings.”119 The court justified this rule by quoting Susan J.
Latham:
[B]y clarifying the rights of a sound recording copyright owner in
regard to derivative works, Section 114(b) makes it clear that the
digital sampling of a copyrighted sound recording must typically be
licensed to avoid an infringement . . . . The import of this language is
that it does not matter how much a digital sampler alters the actual
sounds or whether the ordinary lay observer can or cannot recognize
the song or the artist’s performance of it. Since the exclusive right
encompasses rearranging, remixing, or otherwise altering the actual
sounds, the statute by its own terms precludes the use of a
substantial similarity test.120

But unlike Bridgeport I, Latham recognized a possible de
minimis use defense. First, the quote said sampling would

117. E.g., id. at 141–61.
118. E.g., id.
119. Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 801.
120. Id. at 801 n.10 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Susan J. Latham, Newton v. Diamond: Measuring the
Legitimacy of Unauthorized Compositional Sampling—A Clue Illuminated
and Obscured, 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 119, 125 (2003)).
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“typically”(i.e., generally), require licensing; it failed to
prescribe licensing for all sampling. Second, though right after
the quote, Latham said “the defenses available to a defendant
are significantly limited.”121 Footnote thirty-five, cited by this
last quote, began “[t]here may be the possibility of a de minimis
use defense, depending on how strictly the court interprets the
‘actual sounds’ language of the statute.”122 Third, the quote did
not clearly relate de minimis use with infringement falling
below substantial similarity, and the rest of footnote thirty-five
seems to conflate de minimis use with fair use: “However, a fair
use defense also seems to be limited by § 114(b) to use within
noncommercially distributed educational television and radio
programming.”123
d. Abramson Recognized Possible Substantial Similarity
for Sound Recordings
Bridgeport I also justified different infringement standards
for musical works and sound recordings by assuming an innate
value for tiny sound recording parts,124 relying on a quote from
Abramson’s paper:
[A]ll samples from a record appropriate the work of the musicians
who performed on that record. This enables the sampler to use a
musical performance without hiring either the musician who
originally played it or a different musician to play the music again.
Thus sampling of records . . . allows a producer of music to save
money (by not hiring a musician) without sacrificing the sound and
phrasing of a live musician in the song. This practice poses the
greatest danger to the musical profession because the musician is
being replaced with himself.125

By relying on this quote, Bridgeport I impliedly assumed
Lockean-labor property theory;126 Bridgeport I conferred a
property right on any sound recording excerpt based on labor
expended in creating or obtaining it regardless how small or
insignificant.127
121. Susan J. Lantham, Newton v. Diamond: Measuring the Legitimacy of
Unauthorized Compositional Sampling—A Clue Illuminated and Obscured, 26
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 119, 125 (2003).
122. Id. at 125 n.35 (emphasis added).
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 801–02.
125. Id. at 802 n.14 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Christopher D. Abramson, Digital Sampling and the Recording Musician: A
Proposal for Legislative Protection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1660, 1667–68 (1999)).
126. See infra Part III.A.2.b.i.
127. Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 801–02.
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But Abramson did not exclude other factors from deciding
sound recording infringement. The clause right before the
quote conceded “the length and recognizability of the sample
may be relevant for copyright purposes . . . .”128 In fact, footnote
thirty-eight referred to the Abramson’s next section containing
a more nuanced analysis. In light of Grand Upright’s
vagueness, that section recognized possible de minimis and fair
use defenses despite technical sound recording infringement by
any copying.129 Thus, though Abramson’s paper generally
concerned sampling and labor issues, it recognized possible de
minimis analysis (i.e., lack of substantial similarity) or the
fragmented limited similarity test as applied by Newton.130
ii. Eleventh Circuit District Court Declined to Apply
Bridgeport I
Rejecting Bridgeport I’s bright-line rule forbidding all
sound-recording sampling, the Eleventh Circuit District Court
applied a substantial similarity test for sound recording
reproduction infringement.131 In expressly refusing to follow
Bridgeport I, Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley extensively
critiqued Brideport I’s statutory construction of 17 U.S.C.
§ 114(b).132
First, copyright grants the owner the exclusive right “to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”133
Saregama found no congressional intent to extend § 114(b)’s
derivative work provisions to include “all works containing any
sound from the original sound recording” regardless of
substantial similarity.134

128. Christopher D. Abramson, Digital Sampling and the Recording
Musician: A Proposal for Legislative Protection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1660, 1667
(1999). The full sentence reads, “Although the length and recognizability of the
sample may be relevant for copyright purposes, all samples from a record
appropriate the work of the musicians who performed on that record.” Id.
129. Id. at 1669–72.
130. A section below discusses labor property theory and its relevance to
musical-work and sound-recording reproduction infringement. See infra Part
III.A.2.b.i.
131. Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1339 (S.D. Fla.
2009) (quoting Leigh v. Warner Bros., 212 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000)).
132. Id. at 1340–41.
133. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006).
134. Saregama India Ltd., 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
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Second, § 114(b) exempts similar-sounding, but
independently created, recordings from sound recording
Saregama
rejected
Bridgeport
I’s
infringement.135
interpretation of § 114(b)’s similar-sounding work provision
extending it “to every sound fixed in the work such that a
sample of any sound automatically constitutes infringement.”136
Instead, Saregama interpreted the provision to mean
“protection in a copyrighted sound recording ‘do[es] not extend’
to sound recordings which, although similar-sounding, do not
capture any sounds from the copyrighted sound recording.”137
Third, Saregama found no congressional intent indicating
§ 114(b)’s similar-sounding work provision should not apply to
works which are not similar-sounding or substantially
similar.138 According to the House Report, for a sound
recording, “infringement takes place whenever all or a
substantial portion of the actual sounds that go to make up a
sound recording are reproduced in phonorecords . . . .”139
iii. New York Court Refused to Adopt Bridgeport I Based
on Nimmer
In addition to the Eleventh Circuit District Court, a New
York court refused to adopt the Brideport I standard for the
state’s copyright laws protecting pre-1972 sound recordings.140
New York common law protects sound recordings made before
February 15, 1972, the federal 1971 Sound Recording Act’s
effective date.141 (As noted, federal copyright law does not
preempt state law before the effective date.142) In EMI Records
Ltd. v. Premise Media Corp., the plaintiffs expressly advanced
Bridgeport I as persuasive authority for a New York copyright
infringement claim against a sampler.

135. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2006) (“The exclusive rights of the owner of
copyright in a sound recording under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not
extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that consists
entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds
imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.”).
136. Saregama India Ltd., 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1340.
137. Id. (alteration in original).
138. Id. at 1341.
139. Id. (quoting H. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 106 (1976) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5721).
140. Decision and Order, supra note 91, at 5–7.
141. Id. at 5 (citing Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d
250, 252 (2005)).
142. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1972).
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In rejecting Bridgeport I’s analysis, the New York court
relied on Nimmer’s analysis of Bridgeport I and § 114(b).143
Nimmer reasoned Bridgeport I based its conclusion on flawed
logic: because § 114 exempts a second comer from liability when
no sounds are recaptured, as in a whole sound-alike recording,
then copyright law should impose complete liability when some
sounds are recaptured regardless of substantial similarity.144
But if a whole recording is a sound-alike recording, then there
is no infringement, under the exemption. Taking the
contrapositive, if there is infringement, then not the whole
recording (i.e., at least some of the recording) is not a soundalike recording.
Nimmer also argued § 114(b)’s lawmaking history showed
Congress did not want to chuck the substantial-similarity
infringement test for sound recordings.145 If substantial
similarity implies infringement, the contrapositive says no
infringement implies there is no substantial similarity, subject
to the sound-alike exemption.
III. APPLYING THE FRAGMENTED LITERAL SIMILARITY
TEST TO MUSICAL WORKS AND SOUND RECORDINGS
Music is distinct from what represents it. Music is sounds
or tones arranged to “form structurally complete and
emotionally expressive compositions . . . .”146 Restated, humans
construct music from natural phenomena, sounds and tones, to
form what humans recognize as complete compositions
expressing emotions. But music representations are generally
not sounds or tones. For instance, notes on paper and sound
recordings represent music but are not sounds or tones.147
Through the Copyright Act, Congress chose to protect
specific music representations from infringement. Copyright
law protects music representations “fixed in any tangible

143. Decision and Order, supra note 91, at 5–7 (quoting 4 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[2][b] (2010)
(extensively critiquing Bridgeport I)).
144. Id. at 6.
145. Id.
146. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 894 (Victoria Neufeldt
& David B. Guralnik eds., 3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S].
147. Cf. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437, 448, 451 n.12 (2007)
(analogizing software in the abstract with notes of a symphony and software
in the tangible medium of a CD with sheet music in a patent-dispute context).
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medium of expression.”148 The protected representations are
“musical works, including any accompanying words,” and
“sound recordings.”149 Sound recordings exclude “the sounds
accompanying a motion picture or audiovisual work . . . .”150
Typically, sheet music embodies a musical work, and a
phonorecord, such as a master recording, embodies a sound
recording.151 Compact discs (CDs), audio tape cassettes, and
long-playing records (LPs) reproduced from the master
recording are also phonorecords.152
Musical-work and sound-recording music representations
share similarities. First, neither a “musical work” nor a “sound
recording” is music. Second, each also requires something or
someone to produce music. A musical work requires a human,
mechanical, or electrical musician to produce musical sounds.
Sound recordings require a machine, such as a phonograph or
CD player, to produce music.
A framework for applying the fragmented literal-similarity
test for reproduction infringement of both musical works and
sound recordings appears below. The fragmented literalsimilarity test compares the copyrighted and allegedly
infringing works both quantitatively and qualitatively.153 Both
musical works and sound recordings can be fragmented into
sound quanta; a musical work can be discretized into notes
while a particular sound recording can be discretized into short
recorded-sound snippets.
The quanta of the copyrighted and allegedly infringing
works can be directly compared to test reproduction
infringement. Quantitatively, the allegedly infringing work
would infringe either the musical-work or sound-recording
copyright, or both, when a specified percentage of quanta
match. The qualitative value of the matching quanta to the
copyrighted work would influence the percentage. Lockean
labor can contribute to a sound sample’s qualitative value.

148. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
149. Id. § 102(a)(2), (7).
150. Id. § 101.
151. Id. §§ 101, 102(a), 114(b). The copyrightable works categories
protecting music overlap. Literary works include works expressed in symbols
and include phonorecords. Id. § 101. Dramatic works include accompanying
music (e.g., musical theatre or opera). Id. § 102(a)(3); see also MCJOHN, supra
note 47, at 33–34.
152. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a), 114(b) (2006).
153. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A][2][a].
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Even so, human perceptibility of a sound recording sample
should be a quantitative and qualitative threshold.
This framework applies to musical-work and soundrecording reproduction infringement. When applied to a
musical work, this framework resembles reproduction
infringement analyses the Ninth Circuit rejected in Swirsky v.
Carey.154 The framework can also test sound-recording
infringement in Bridgeport I. The framework also gives a
simple method for testing whether the album Feed the Animals
infringes the musical works and sound recordings sampled by
Girl Talk.
A. FRAMEWORK FOR APPLYING FRAGMENTED LITERAL
SIMILARITY TO MUSICAL WORKS AND SOUND RECORDINGS
As noted above, the fragmented literal similarity test
probes for a copyrighted work’s literal elements scattered
through an allegedly infringing work.155 The very formulation
of substantial similarity as a “fragmented” similarity implies
comparing a copyrighted work’s discrete elements with an
allegedly infringing work’s discrete elements. This paper’s
sound quanta may differ from Nimmers’ quanta.
1. Musical Works156
As already noted, the Ninth Circuit applied its own version
of the fragmented literal similarity test to a specific musical
work. This section shows the general applicability of the
fragmented literal similarity test to musical works
reproduction infringement generally, not only to specific
alleged infringing music samples.
Musical notes are like letters in a word language. Letters
and words digitize the analog reality into discrete
representations.157 As written text represents speech as letters
and words, sheet music represents music as notes written left

154. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841 passim (9th Cir. 2004), rev’g 226 F.
Supp. 2d 1224 (2002).
155. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A][2].
156. See generally PHIL WINSOR & GENE DELISA, COMPUTER MUSIC IN C, at
1–32 (1991) (describing digitizing music as parameters for the musical
instrument digital interface (MIDI) format); 3 BILL GIBSON, THE AUDIOPRO
HOME RECORDING COURSE 9–59 (1999) (describing Musical Instrument
Digital Interface theory and sequencing).
157. STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT 4 (2010).
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to right on “staves.”158 Time runs from left to right.159 At the
staff’s or line’s right end, the notes continue on the next staff or
line at the left and continue to the right.160 More lines with
more notes represent more music.161 In this way, sheet music
innately represents music discretely, or digitally, as notes in
time.
Carrying the analogy with written word language further,
each set of multiple notes played simultaneously, as in an
interval or chord, could correspond to a different “letter” in a
music representation “language.” Successive “letters” could be
grouped into “words.”
Given this sheet music structure, the fragmented literal
similarity test can readily decide musical-work reproduction
infringement. Expressing music as a musical work on sheet
music innately discretizes music. A quantitative comparison
should simply weigh how many notes in an alleged infringing
recording’s section match notes in a copyrighted musical work
section.
And, this approach works better for music than for words.
Words have many ordering rules. For instance, “clerk” is a
valid word, but “krelc” is gibberish. Even so, a book merely
chucking all of another book’s vowels would likely infringe; vn
s, bk mrly chckng ll f nthr bk’s vwls wld lkly nfrng. Though at
first it might jar the senses, the meaning would be fairly clear.
The missing vowels would merely be a gimmick to evade exact
copying though the books would be substantially similar.
Music notes have fewer ordering problems. Notes played in
reverse order will not have the same effect, but most people will
recognize them as music, not gibberish. For instance, a piano,
guitar, or trombone playing G then E then C rather than C
then E then G would still play “music” while “krelc” is
gibberish.
Under fragmented similarity, the allegedly infringing
work’s notes could be separated by notes absent from the
copyrighted section yet still yield the required substantial
similarity. For instance, a song’s melody often defines a
copyrighted musical work’s most recognizable part162 and thus

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

E.g., WALTER PISTON, HARMONY (3d ed. 1962).
Id.
Id.
Id.
WEBSTER’S, supra note 146, at 845 (including the musical definitions
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contains qualitatively significant notes. Suppose the suspect
work contains a quantitatively significant percentage of melody
notes from the copyrighted musical work. The suspect work
could then have embellishing notes between the same
copyrighted notes yet still infringe as substantially similar
judged by fragmented literal similarity.
Relying on the music representation “language” outlined
above, a fact-finder could more finely test similarity by
comparing intervals or chords in the copyrighted and suspect
sections. The language would uniquely represent an interval or
a chord like a letter or word in English. For instance, a simple
triad C chord is formed from the notes C, E, and G in a single
octave. A matching “letter” or “word” in the suspect section
would include some or all of the notes in a corresponding
interval or chord in the copyrighted section. Thus, a fact-finder
might define a match for the C triad as the same C-E-G triad,
as the intervals C-G, C-E, or E-G, or as the single notes C, E, or
G. (Due to the harmonious nature of octaves, the triads,
intervals, or notes can have very similar musical effects even if
the notes lie in different octaves.163 Mathematically, deeming
notes separated by an octave to be the same imposes a periodic
structure. In essence, the twelve-note chromatic scale with
octaves identified (e.g., identifying all C’s as the same note
regardless of octave separation) and equating transposed notes,
chords, and keys, defines a system which is invariant under
circular rotations generated by the complex number ei/6.164 )
The quantitative analysis would be the same as for a lone
melody.
2. Sound Recordings
Unlike musical works, sound recordings may be analog or
digital.165 The traditional analog LP or tape recording embodies
2b: “the element of form having to do with the arrangement of single notes in
sequence (distinguished from HARMONY);” and 2c: “the leading part, or voice,
in a harmonic composition”); see also PISTON, supra note 158, at 3, 71, 125
(noting the top voice in harmonized music is heard as the melody in
homophonic music and multiple melodic lines may be heard in polyphonic
music).
163. See, e.g., PISTON, supra note 158, at 6 (reducing compound intervals
by subtracting the octave).
164. See, e.g., RUEL V. CHURCHILL ET AL., COMPLEX VARIABLES AND
APPLICATIONS 11–19 (4th ed. 1984).
165. E.g., DAVID MILES HUBER & ROBERT E. RUNSTEIN, MODERN
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a continuous transcription of musical sounds into wax, metal,
or vinyl LP grooves166 or magnetic (metal) tape film.167 In
transcribing the sound, the recorder moves along the recording
medium to physically represent the sound in the medium; the
groove or magnetized tape lengthens as the sound recording
time increases.168 A sound recording medium property varies
continuously along the medium with the continuous change in
music in time.169 For instance, the LP groove’s contour and the
magnetic film’s magnetized pattern vary along their lengths
commensurate with recording time.170 In this way, analog
recording continuously, and possibly exactly, transcribes sound.
Unlike analog recording, digital recording must inexactly
transcribe sound.171 Digital recording represents music by
breaking waveforms into small segments.172 By taking shorter
time intervals, the digital recording better represents the
music.173 But at some shortest time interval, the representation
can become better than can be humanly perceived.174
The fragmented literal similarity test can readily test for
sound recording infringement. Any analog recording can be
represented digitally or converted to a digital recording,175 so

RECORDING TECHNIQUES 187–298 (6th ed. 2005); GIBSON, supra note 156, at
61–95.
166. E.g., IAN SINCLAIR, ELECTRONICS SIMPLIFIED 119–24 (3d ed. 2011),
Improvement in Phonograph or Speaking Machs., U.S. Patent No. 200,521
(filed Dec. 24, 1877) (issued Feb. 19, 1878).
167. SINCLAIR, supra note 166, at 124–28; see also HUBER & RUNSTEIN,
supra note 165, at 189–90; GIBSON, supra note 156, at 61–64.
168. SINCLAIR, supra note 166 at 119–28; see also ‘521 Patent; HUBER &
RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 189–90; GIBSON, supra note 156, at 61–64.
169. SINCLAIR, supra note 166, at 119–28; see also ‘521 Patent; HUBER &
RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 189–90; GIBSON, supra note 156, at 61–64.
170. SINCLAIR, supra note 166, at 119–28; see also ‘521 Patent; HUBER &
RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 189–90; GIBSON, supra note 156, at 61–64.
171. SINCLAIR, supra note 166, at 119–28; see also GIBSON, supra note 156,
at 62–64, 67–90; HUBER & RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 216–24.
172. HUBER & RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 217–19; see also GIBSON,
supra note 156, at 62–64, 67–74; SINCLAIR, supra note 166, at 123–36.
173. HUBER & RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 217–19; see also GIBSON,
supra note 156, at 62–64, 67–74; SINCLAIR, supra note 166, at 123–36.
174. See HUBER & RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 36, 221 (showing the
upper frequency limit of human hearing, 20 kilohertz (kHz), can be effectively
represented by time segments occurring at a 44.1 kHz rate); see generally
GIBSON, supra note 156, at 78–79 (listing various common sampling rates and
indicating 44.1 kHz as the common CD sampling rate).
175. See HUBER & RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 215–26; GIBSON, supra
note 156, at 62–64.
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making a framework for applying the fragmented literal
similarity test only requires considering digital soundrecordings. Rather than describing sound recordings with a
general musical language such as notes for musical works, it
will generally be more convenient to choose a language specific
to a particular sound recording. A section of a copyrighted
digital sound recording will have a finite, though possibly large,
number of digital pieces or snippets. Those pieces will be
ordered in time to produce music when played in a player, such
as a CD player or computer. Each snippet would belong to the
sound recording’s own musical language.
The musical-works-test framework readily extends to
testing sound-recording infringement. The fact finder replaces
notes, intervals, or chords with snippets in the musical-works
comparison framework. Following the musical-works analysis,
the fragmented literal similarity test can show substantial
similarity when the allegedly infringing sound recording
contains snippets from the copyrighted sound recording. But
the reproduced snippets may be separated by other snippets
not in the copyrighted sound recording section.
a. Quantitative Value
The snippets in the suspect work could be separated by
recorded segments not from the copyrighted section work yet
still yield the requisite quantitative similarity. For instance,
the allegedly infringing work could have the same snippets as a
section of a copyrighted sound recording with added
embellishing snippets between the snippets from the
copyrighted section yet still infringe. In the example, as all
snippets in the copyrighted section appear in the allegedly
infringing section, the qualitatively important snippets of the
copyrighted section will be included. But their qualitative
import in the alleged infringing section would depend on other
factors such as their prominence in the suspect passage. As
with the musical works analysis, the allegedly infringing work
would infringe the sound recording when a specified percentage
of snippets match those of the copyrighted section.
b. Qualitative Value
Fragmented

literal

similarity

weighs

the

snippet’s
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qualitative value to the copyrighted work.176 Lockean labor can
contribute to a sound snippet’s qualitative value, but it does not
imply all sound snippets have a qualitative value to the
copyrighted work. Lockean-labor value can include the snippet
length or duration and volume. But human perceptibility
should be a threshold for qualitative value.
i. Labor Property Theory and Sound Samples
Lockean-labor property theory permits a person to
establish a property right by investing labor in an object or
thing.177 Bridgeport I assumed the Lockean-labor property
theory when it argued even tiny sound recording snippets had
value.178 Bridgeport I argued “even when a small part of a
sound recording is sampled, the part taken is something of
value” and quoted Abramson’s paper for support.179 My
approach posits not all samples have value.
a. Sound Length—Duration
Not all samples have equal value. Assuming a sound
sample has some value directly proportional to its length (in
time), merely truncating it would diminish its value. With
repeated truncations, its length would become quite small.
Eventually, the length would fall below detectability, either for
a particular technology or in an absolute sense. At that point,
this ultimately truncated sample would have its smallest
quantum of value.
Of course, the original copyrighted music section’s different
subsections could have different values. If the original music
section’s whole duration or length had one tone at a constant

176. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A][2].
177. See, e.g., COHEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 11–12 (citing JOHN LOCKE,
TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT, BOOK II, at ch. V (1690)). But see WILLIAM
A. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2003) (citing Wendy J. Gordon, A Property
Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) and Alfred C. Yen, Restoring
the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 15 OHIO STATE L.J. 517
(1990)) (acknowledging Lockean labor as a copyright justification but arguing
copyright is cumulative and not “merely the fruit of one’s own labors.”).
178. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I), 410 F.3d
792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005).
179. Id. at 802 & n.14 (quoting Christopher D. Abramson, Digital
Sampling and the Recording Musician: A Proposal for Legislative Protection,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1660, 1667 (1999)).
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volume, all subsections would have the same value. But if the
tone waivered in pitch or volume, different subsections might
have different intrinsic values resulting in eventually achieving
different quanta.
Assuming value directly relates to length impliedly relies
on Lockean labor theory. A longer sample represents music
played for a longer time. For the single tone held at a constant
volume, a longer tone represents more labor by a musician, a
recording engineering, and a record producer. Recording a
longer tone would also require more physical resources in a
longer tape length, more memory in a computer or recording
workstation, or more physical space on a CD or LP.180
b. Volume
Similar arguments may be made for volume proportional to
labor expended. Higher volume coming from acoustic
instruments generally requires more physical work. For
instance, blowing a horn harder, hitting a drum harder, and
strumming a guitar more vigorously will all produce louder
sounds than using less effort. Likewise, electrical energy from
electric instruments transformed into acoustic sound via
transducers is louder with higher wattage amplifiers.181
ii. Reproduced Sound’s Human Perceptibility
Despite Lockean labor theory’s traditional appeal, a sound
sample’s qualitative value should also depend on human
perceptibility. Because the recorded tone represents music, one
should distinguish between the technically feasible and the
humanly perceivable. The qualitative value of imperceptible
sound snippets’ qualitative values should be insignificant or
zero in applying fragmented literal similarity.
Analog recording at a higher tape speed or with more
revolutions of a cylinder or playing record per second182 directly
corresponds to a tone of the same time duration or length
requiring longer tape lengths or recording-groove travel.183 But
180. See Improvement in Phonograph or Speaking Machs., U.S. Patent No.
200,521 (filed Dec. 24, 1877) (issued Feb. 19, 1878); see GIBSON, supra note
156, at 61–64; HUBER & RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 189–90.
181. See, e.g., HUBER & RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 29–31, 33–37, 51–56.
182. For example, thirty-three revolutions per minute (RPM) for LP
records and forty-five RPM for records having a single song per side.
183. See ‘521 Patent; see also GIBSON, supra note 156, at 61–64; HUBER &
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the recorded tone’s quality generally improves because more
physical media records the same sound; the resolution is
higher. Particularly at very high tape speeds or revolution
rates, it may be technically possible to capture individual sound
quanta that are too short to be humanly perceived on playback.
Thus, as a representation of sounds and music, a very highquality analog recording can have a non-zero length in the
recording medium which makes a sound too short to be heard
on playback at normal speed.
Unlike analog recording, digital recording has some innate
limitations. But like analog recording, digitizing sound breaks
an analog signal into sound representation snippets that may
also be too short to be perceived on playback; a digitization rate
(i.e., frequency) of roughly 44.1 kilohertz, and the
corresponding medium length, represents the upper limit of
human hearing.184
B. APPLYING FRAGMENTED LITERAL SIMILARITY AND DE MINIMIS
STANDARDS TO SAMPLED SOUND RECORDINGS
1. Musical Work Infringement—Swirsky v. Carey
In Swirsky v. Carey, the Ninth Circuit employed a two-part
substantial similarity test for music-work infringement.185
Generally, the test included an objective extrinsic test of
expression and ideas and a subjective intrinsic test.186 The
intrinsic test would have asked whether an “ordinary,
reasonable observer” would find substantial similarity of
expression.187 But in reviewing summary judgment, Swirsky
only considered the extrinsic test because juries apply the
intrinsic test.188

RUNSTEIN, supra note 165, at 189–90.
184. See HUBER & RUNSTEIN, supra note 165 at 36, 221 (showing the upper
frequency limit of human hearing, 20 kHz, can be effectively represented by
time segments occurring at a 44.1 kHz rate); see generally GIBSON, supra note
156, at 78–79 (listing various common sampling rates and indicating 44.1 kHz
as the common CD sampling rate).
185. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 844–45 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’g 226 F.
Supp. 2d 1224 (2002).
186. Id.
187. Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994)).
188. Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 845 (citing Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170,
1174 (9th Cir. 2003) and Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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The Ninth Circuit rejected Walser’s and the district court’s
approaches comparing notes because they could let persons
untrained in music judge substantial similarity devoid of
considering harmonic progression, tempo, and key.189 Even so,
the court expressly refused to announce any uniform factors for
the extrinsic objective test.190 In dicta, the court said the
extrinsic test is simpler to apply to literary works such as
books, films, and television shows than music because they are
more easily broken into discrete elements such as “plot,
themes, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of
events.”191
This paper expresses the opposite view. Plot, themes, etc.
are not manifestly discrete elements. But the music’s
mathematical representations as notes in musical compositions
and digitized sound recordings necessarily have discrete
elements.
Unlike the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, the present framework
comports with both the Walser and district court approaches.
Walser noted similarities between the plaintiff’s work One of
Those Love Songs (One) and the defendant’s Thank God I
Found You (Thank God) by selectively comparing notes.192
Walser discounted ornamental notes.193 Generally, an
ornamental tone embellishes a main melodic tone.194 Here, the
quantitative comparison also compares individual notes and
possibly drops notes when employing fragmented literal
similarity. By considering some tones ornamental, Walser
impliedly assigned a qualitatively higher value to some main
melodic tones. He assigned a qualitatively higher value to notes
falling on a beat.195
The district court also compared the musical work’s
individual notes.196 It represented tones as numerical

189. Id. at 845–48.
190. Id. at 845–49.
191. Id. at 849 n.15 (quoting Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th
Cir. 2002) (quoting Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042,
1045 (9th Cir. 1994))).
192. Id. at 846–47.
193. Id.
194. WEBSTER’S, supra note 146, at 955 (“ornament,” definition 5); see
PISTON, supra note 158, at 89, 253.
195. Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 847.
196. Id. at 847–48.
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sequences.197 Musicians routinely represent standard
chromatic scale notes as numbers.198 The present framework
deems this representation a digitization. Nothing in the
present framework precludes considering all the copyrighted
work’s melodic notes, but a fragmented literal similarity test, as
opposed to comprehensive nonliteral similarity, does not
require it.199 Comparing a note sequence from the suspect
work, Thank God, with a sequence in the copyrighted work,
One, would test whether a quantitatively significant percentage
of One had been copied. Other factors, such as perceptibility,
volume, length, and falling on the beat, would determine the
notes qualitative import to One.
2. Sound Recording Infringement—Bridgeport I
Contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule, the present
approach does not automatically find infringement for copies of
even tiny parts of copyrighted sound recordings. The sampled
part from the copyrighted sound recording Get Off contained
three notes from the guitar solo.200 The notes pass human
perceptibility because they were perceivable as notes.201 If two
large time intervals separated the three notes, they would
likely be quantitatively insignificant to the section containing
all three notes. Thus, there would be no fragmented literal
similarity and no infringement of the sound recording.
But if the three notes were roughly consecutive in one
section of the solo, they might be qualitatively and
quantitatively significant to the sound recording section by
analogy with the melody analysis above. Given the prominence
of a guitar solo in a song,202 the three notes would likely be
qualitatively significant even if the section had other notes,
such as rhythm and bass guitar notes and chords, played
simultaneously with the three notes.
But the appellate and district court descriptions conflict

197. Id.
198. See, e.g., BRUCE BENWARD, SIGHTSINGING COMPLETE 1 (2d ed. 1973);
SOL BERKOWITZ ET AL., A NEW APPROACH TO SIGHT SINGING 2 (2d ed. 1976);
WEBSTER’S, supra note 146, at 250; WINSOR & DELISA, supra note 156, at 27.
199. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03.
200. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I), 410 F.3d
792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005).
201. Id.
202. See PISTON, supra note 158, at 3, 71, 125 (noting prominence of a
melody such as a guitar solo).
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somewhat. The appellate decision describes the sampled
section as a guitar-solo part looped to form sixteen beats and
played in five places in 100 Miles.203 The district court
describes the three notes as “a two-second portion of a chord
Unlike
pianists,
guitarists
very
rarely
section.”204
simultaneously play notes in chords because strumming a
chord requires playing individual strings, though quickly.205 A
single two-second chord could hardly be deemed quantitatively
significant in to the whole Get Off recording. Also, the notes of a
single chord notes may not be humanly perceptible as single
notes and thus not qualitatively significant to the Get Off sound
recording.
Even so, though the district court in essence applied
Newton’s approach for testing infringement of sampled musical
works to sampled sound recordings,206 the present framework
differs from the district court’s.
The district court did not clearly delineate de minimis
analysis from fragmented literal similarity and fair use.207 It
recognized de minimis use as literally copying a small and
insignificant part of copyrighted work falling below the
substantial similarity standard.208 It also noted other courts
had considered qualitative and quantitative measures of
appropriated elements in sampling cases.209 But it also posited
applying Nimmer’s fragmented literal similarity.210
The court then analyzed the sample’s quantitative and
qualitative features in the copyrighted sound recording, Get
Off, and the suspect work, 100 Miles. The court noted the
sampled section was quantitatively small, two seconds,
compared with Get Off’s total two-and-one-half minute

203. Bridgeport I, 410 F.3d at 796.
204. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 841
(M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
205. See FLETCHER & ROSSING, supra note 93, at 255, 352–59.
206. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d at 841 (citing Newton v.
Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Jarvis v. A&M
Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 291 (D.N.J. 1993)), aff’d, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir.
2004)).
207. Bridgeport Music, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d at 839–42.
208. Id. at 841 (citing Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir.
1983) (Motley, J.)).
209. Id. (citing Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (citing Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 291 (D.N.J. 1993))).
210. Id.
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length.211 But the Court noted the alleged infringer looped the
sample to at most forty seconds of 100 Miles total four-and-onehalf minute length and thus formed a more significant part of
the suspect work than Get Off.212 More importantly, the court
found the sampled two-section section qualitatively
insignificant in 100 Miles based the songs’ overall lack of
similarity and theme, and a lay observer’s inability to discern
the sample in 100 Miles.213 The court then conflated the
analysis with fair use by discussing striking a balance between
protecting artists and depriving the building blocks of
creation.214
In contrast, the present framework more faithfully applies
the Nimmer fragmented literal similarity test. Nimmer’s
fragmented literal similarity only demands the part be
quantitatively and qualitatively significant to the plaintiff’s
work; the test ignores the quantitative and qualitative import
of the copyrighted part in the defendant’s work.215 Thus, the
present framework does not weigh the songs overall similarity
and theme or whether a lay observer would discern the
sampled part in the suspect work. The lay observer only enters
the framework through minimal human perceptibility of the
copied part in general, not in the suspect work. By ignoring
overall similarity and theme, the present framework more
clearly focuses on the sounds reproduced by making a more
mathematical analysis. Thus, a song, such as 100 Miles, that
copied the quantitatively and qualitative insignificant twosecond portion would not infringe the Get Off sound recording
regardless the times the suspect song (e.g., 100 Miles) looped
the two-second section. But by chucking overall similarity and
theme, taking a quantitatively and qualitatively significant
part of Get Off would infringe the Get Off sound recording
regardless of genre; the analysis would focus on the sound itself.
3. Musical Works and Sound Recordings—Girl Talk
Girl Talk’s Feed the Animals216 album used about 300
samples from about 100 MP3’s.217 The musical-works
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 842.
Id.
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A][1][e][2][a].
GIRL TALK (GREGG GILLIS), FEED THE ANIMALS (Illegal Art 2008).
Day to Day: Girl Talk Chops Music to Pieces (NPR broadcast Oct. 10,
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infringement analysis simply applies the digitization through
notes analysis.
Analyzing Girl Talk’s collages for sound-recording
infringement becomes harder without Bridgeport I’s bright-line
rule, but the fragmented literal similarity framework can be
applied to them. Because MP3’s are digital sound recording
representations of music, Feed the Animals contains a finite
number of snippets. It should be fairly easy for the soundrecordings’ copyright-owners to generate the sound recording
language for each of their sound recordings amongst the 100.
With the language in hand, each copyright owner could readily
compare the sound recording against Feed the Animals to see
whether the album had quantitatively significant parts of the
copied sound recording. The qualitative value would depend on
details of the particular sampled copyrighted part.
If some sound recording owners cannot detect parts of their
own works actually in Feed the Animals, this fact may suggest
quantitative
or
qualitative
insignificance,
such
as
imperceptibility, in the original copyrighted work and the
absence of substantial similarity. In practice, an undetected
infringement will remain moot.
Rather than fair use, the main defense would be de
minimis use falling below substantial similarity under the
fragmented literal similarity test.
IV. FRAGMENTED LITERAL SIMILARITY WORKS TO TEST
INFRINGEMENT OF MUSIC REPRESENTED AS A
MUSICAL WORK OR A SOUND RECORDING
Newton v. Diamond and Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
Dimension Films have left an unsatisfying legacy of drastically
disparate reproduction rights for musical works and sound
recordings. The substantial similarity standard should be
applied to decide whether music, represented as either a
musical work or a sound recording, is infringed. When the
substantial similarity standard is applied to a music recording
containing sampled copyrighted recordings, the fragmented
literal similarity test works for both musical-work and soundrecording infringement.
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